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"[T]here is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to con-
duct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduc-
tion of a new order of things."'
t B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 2006; candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School,
2009; Note Editor, Volume 94, Cornell Law Review. I am grateful to Professor Muna B.
Ndulo for his insightful feedback, to Jonah Fecteau for his direction, and to the Cornell
International Law Journal, especially Laura Wexler, Michael Litvin, and Skyler Tanner,
for the opportunity to publish this Note. Thank you to my friends and family for your
support.
1. NlccoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 17 (Robert M. Adams ed. & trans., Norton
Press 1977) (1513).
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Introduction
When the interests of powerful states coincide, the appearance of a
supranational global order takes hold. But this appearance is illusory. The
case of Iraq demonstrates that a powerful state acting without authoriza-
tion from the United Nations Security Council can drastically alter condi-
tions on a global scale. The trial of Saddam Hussein further reveals that a
weak state, backed by a strong state, may take the lead in transitional jus-
tice. This reality has forced the United Nations Security Council-charged
with maintaining and restoring global peace and security2 -to react to the
actions of states through post hoc declarations of support for the parties it
views as most able to secure peace in the aftermath of upheaval.
This Note contends that the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) shows the pre-
eminence of states in matters of war and peace and, consequently, in tran-
sitional criminal justice. Although internationalized efforts are possible if
states achieve broad consensus, the United States' effort in Iraq demon-
strates that international consensus is not a precondition to action. Fur-
ther, the Security Council's designation of the United States and the United
Kingdom as "occupying powers" in Iraq 3 indicates that consensus may not
be a precondition for legitimacy either. Part I of this Note explores several
important precedents: the post-World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo trials,
the United Nations Security Council's ad hoc tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the multilateral treaty-based International
Criminal Court. Part II examines the Iraqi High Tribunal's governing stat-
ute, analyzes its application at the Saddam Hussein trial in light of histori-
cal precedents, and argues that the Tribunal convicted Saddam Hussein on
legally defensible grounds. Part III evaluates the institutional legitimacy of
the IHT in light of the circumstances under which it was formed, and pro-
poses a three-pronged test for assessing the legitimacy of criminal tribu-
nals, such as the IHT, that apply international criminal law. Finally, this
Note concludes with an observation about the respective roles of states and
the Security Council in transitional justice and world politics based on the
developments in post-invasion Iraq. This Note contends that unilateral
actions by individual states force the Security Council to react and realign
itself in light of its responsibility to maintain and restore global peace and
security.
I. The Development of International Criminal Law
A. The Nuremberg Trials
1. The War Unfolds
When thinking about the Nuremberg Trials, a good place to start is the
Allied military victory. 4 On May 7, 1945, after Hitler committed suicide
2. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41-42.
3. S.C. Res. 1483, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
4. See Lisa Yavnai, Military justice: War Crimes Trials in the American Zone of Occu-
pation in Germany, 1945-1947, in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Vol. 41
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and the Nazi regime collapsed, 5 Germany surrendered unconditionally,
giving the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and
France "the undoubted right ... to legislate for the occupied territories."
6
The right to legislate encompassed the power to create courts to prosecute
Nazi criminals. 7 Before these prosecutions could occur, however, the Allies
needed to reach an agreement on how to proceed.
A full-fledged International Military Tribunal (IMT) was by no means
a foregone conclusion. An IMT was not the sole solution proposed for deal-
ing with Nazi officials after the Allied victory, and it came about only after
years of military and political struggle.8 The State Department and its Brit-
ish counterpart, the Foreign Office, initially resisted the idea of interna-
tional war crimes prosecutions. 9 Eventually, however, "The German Policy
of Extermination of the Jewish Race"'1 and numerous other inhuman poli-
cies administered by the Nazis received official condemnation and a prom-
ise of justice." In the Moscow Declaration of November 1943, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Premier
SINCE 1945 191, 192 (Herbert R. Reginbogin & Christoph J. M. Safferling eds., 2006)
[hereinafter THE NUREMBERG TRIALS] ("The U.S. Army became involved in the war crimes
issue soon after the D-day invasion."); Kenneth Anderson, Nuremberg Sensibility: Telford
Taylor's Memoir of the Nuremberg Trials, 7 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 281, 292 (1994) (reviewing
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992)) ("Nuremberg was...
'not a substitute for D-day.' A military victory is not simply a practical prerequisite to a
trial .... but a moral necessity.").
5. For narrative and images, see Smithsonian National Museum of American His-
tory, The Price of Freedom: Americans at War, World War II, http://americanhistory.si.
edu/militaryhistory/printable/section.asp?id=9&sub=7 (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
6. OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, NAZI
CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION: OPINION AND JUDGMENT 48 (1947) [hereinafter NUREMBERG
JUDGMENT], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/NT Nazi-opinion-
judgment.pdf; cf. Bernard Meltzer, Remembering Nuremberg, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY
OF NUREMBERG 20, 20 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999) [hereinafter WAR CRIMES] ("The way
for the trial was paved by Germany's unconditional surrender .. .and by the Allies'
capture of the major surviving leaders of the Nazi regime.").
7. See NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 6, at 48 ("The making of the [Nuremberg]
Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries to which the
German Reich unconditionally surrendered .... ); see also Yavnai, supra note 4, at 192
("The U.S. Army, as occupier of Germany, had authority to prosecute war crimes within
its zone of occupation ....").
8. See KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIALS (2006) 28-29; Raymond M. Brown, The American Perspective on Nuremberg: A
Case of Cascading Ironies, in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 4, at 21, 21-23 (noting
that "the broader American Consensus for trials developed slowly"); David Cesarani,
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: British Perspectives, in THE NUREMBERG
TRIALS, supra note 4, at 31, 32-36.
9. See, e.g., 1 DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A PROSECUTOR'S
COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 23-24 (1999) [hereinafter 1 SPRECHER] (describing the State
Department resisting President Roosevelt's appointment of Herbert C. Pell to the United
Nations War Crimes Commission as "an open and behind the scenes struggle" by "an
old guard group of officials"); Cesarani, supra note 8, at 32 ("From 1939 to 1942, the
Foreign Office [FO] was adamantly opposed to any form of judicial retribution ...
except in the case of war crimes, as conventionally defined, and committed only against
British and Allied nationals.").
10. 1 SPRECHER, supra note 9, at 24.
11. See id. at 25.
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Joseph Stalin vowed that German "criminals whose offenses have no par-
ticular geographic location . . . will be punished by joint decision of the
Governments of the Allies."' 2
The Allied heads of state, however, disagreed about the substance of
the envisaged punishment. Stalin's official position was that Nazi leaders
should be put to death only after a trial, 13 while Churchill and Roosevelt
initially advocated summary execution of Nazi "outlaws."'14 The influen-
tial U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, also favored sum-
mary executions.' 5 The advocates for death by firing squad argued that
the culpability of Nazi leaders and the scale of their crimes were so obvious
as to be undeserving of judicial proceedings. 16 American public opinion
seemed to reject Morgenthau's draconian plan, however, and helped con-
vince Roosevelt to accept Secretary of War Henry Stimson's competing
argument that the United States' fundamental respect for due process com-
pelled war crimes trials. 17 On May 8, 1945, President Truman appointed
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson as the U.S. Chief of Counsel and
directed him to work with the Allies on creating an international tribunal
with which to prosecute Axis war criminals. 18
Representatives of the four Allied powers met in London during the
summer of 1945 to negotiate plans for a war crimes trial. 19 One source of
disagreement involved competing procedural approaches to criminal law:
the Americans and the British had adversarial systems, while the Soviets
and the French used an inquisitorial approach.20 A second source of ten-
sion was the American insistence on a conspiracy provision in the Nurem-
berg Charter 2 1 and a conspiracy charge in the indictment of the Nazi
leaders. 2 2 Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter largely reflected the U.S.
12. Id. at 27 (quoting the Moscow Declaration (Nov. 1, 1943)).
13. See MOGHALU, supra note 8, at 28; MichaelJ. Bazyler, The Role of the Soviet Union
in the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note
4, at 45, 45 (noting, however, that the Soviet vision of trials likely consisted of "show
trials").
14. Cesarani, supra note 8, at 34.
15. See MOGHALU, supra note 8, at 28-29; Bazyler, supra note 13, at 45.
16. See MOGHALU, supra note 8, at 28.
17. See id. at 28-29.
18. See Whitney R. Harris, Tyranny on Trial- Trial of Major German War Criminals at
Nuremberg, Germany, 1945-1946, in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 4, at 106, 106.
19. See 1 SPRECHER, supra note 9, at 43.
20. See id. Differences in procedural approaches left the roles of judges, prosecu-
tion, and defense counsel at a war crimes trial in doubt. See id. The final draft incorpo-
rated aspects of both systems: a lengthy, detailed indictment and final statements by the
defendants free from cross-examination, as favored by the Soviets and the French; and
the central role of prosecutors in the presentation of evidence, as endorsed by the Ameri-
cans and the British. See id. at 44.
21. For more information, see discussion infra Part I.A.2.
22. See Edward M. Wise, The Significance of Nuremberg, in WAR CRIMES, supra note 6,
at 55, 60. Justice Jackson pursued a theory that "[elverything the Nazi regime did was
alleged to have been done, from the beginning, with the intent of carrying out a conspir-
acy or common plan to subjugate the European continent." Id. at 61.
Vol. 41
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preference. 23 On August 8, 1945, the Allies signed the London Agree-
ment,2 4 to which they annexed the Nuremberg Charter. 25
2. The Nuremberg Charter
The Nuremberg Charter established "an International Military Tribu-
nal . . . for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis.' 26 The Charter provided the Tribunal with
jurisdiction to try and punish "persons who, acting in the interests of the
European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organi-
zations, ' '2 7 committed "Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes
Against Humanity."28 Article 6 of the Charter defines these three offenses:
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or depor-
tation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on
the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by mili-
tary necessity;
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connexion [sic] with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of
the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 29
Article 6 placed additional liability on "[1]eaders, organizers, instigators
and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a com-
mon plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes . . . for all
acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan."30
23. See id. (noting that, in Article 6 of the Charter, the definition of Crimes Against
Peace includes liability for participation in a "common plan or conspiracy," while the
definitions of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity do not).
24. See Agreement for the Establishment of an International Military Tribunal, Aug.
8, 1945, 5 U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter London Agreement].
25. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
26. Id. art. 1.
27. Id. art. 6.
28. See id. art. 6(a). The term "genocide" is absent from the text of the Charter. See
generally id.
29. Id. art. 6(a)-(c).
30. Id. art. 6(c). Colonel Murray Bernays, head of special projects at the Intelligence
Division of the U.S. Army General Staff, first proposed the idea of a conspiracy charge.
See Wise, supra note 22, at 60. During the London negotiations, the French delegation
protested that the common law notion of a conspiracy was a "barbarous legal anachro-
nism." Id. at 61. Throughout the London negotiations, and later during trial, European
counsel did not fully embrace the criminal conspiracy idea. See id.
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Articles 7 and 8 of the Nuremberg Charter complemented Article 6 by
stripping the accused of two potential defenses. 31 Article 7 preempted the
official immunity, or state acts, defense: "The official position of defend-
ants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in government
departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or
mitigating punishment."3 2 Article 8 addressed the defense of superior
orders (the converse of official immunity): "The fact that the defendant
acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free
him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punish-
ment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. '33 In his opening
statement to the Tribunal, Justice Robert Jackson observed that the twin
principles of state acts and superior orders "have heretofore resulted in
immunity for practically everyone concerned in the really great crimes
against peace and mankind. Those in lower ranks were protected... by the
orders of their superiors. The superiors were protected because their
orders were called acts of state."34 The Nuremberg Charter made the
extraordinary advance of rejecting these twin immunities.3 5
The structural and procedural framework of the Nuremberg Charter
guaranteed the accused minimum rights "to ensure [a] fair trial for the
defendants. '36 One of these rights required providing a specific translated
indictment to the defendants at a reasonable time before trial.3 7 Secondly,
throughout preliminary proceedings and trial, a defendant had "the right
to give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him."38 Third,
the preliminary examinations and trial were to be conducted in (or trans-
lated into) the defendants' native language. 39 Each defendant also had the
significant choice to either employ the assistance of counsel or represent
himself. 40 With or without the assistance of counsel, defendants had the
right to present evidence and cross-examine prosecution witnesses. 4 1
3. Application of the Nuremberg Charter to the Nazi Trial
During the 315 days of proceedings, the International Military Tribu-
nal heard testimony against twenty-two high-ranking Nazi officials.42 After
31. Meltzer, supra note 6, at 21 ("[Iln combination[, the rejected defenses] might
have immunized all the defendants.").
32. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 7.
33. Id. art. 8.
34. 1 SPRECHER, supra note 9, at 163.
35. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, arts. 7-8.
36. See id. art. 16. Of course a tribunal's own charter cannot simply declare that it
will "ensure" a fair trial. The language rings of formal aspiration.
37. See id. art. 16(a).
38. Id. art. 16(b).
39. See id. art. 16(c).
40. See id. art. 16(d). In contrast, the tribunal that would try Saddam Hussein did
not allow defendants the right to conduct their own defense. See infra note 185 and
accompanying text.
41. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 16(e).
42. MOGHALU, supra note 8, at 29. The defendants included Rudolf Hess, Hitler's
private secretary; Hermann Goering, commander of the German Air Force; Karl
Doenitz, Supreme Commander of the German Navy and leader of the Nazi Government
Vol. 41
2008 National Dominance in the Effort to Try Saddam Hussein 781
an entire first day devoted to reading the indictment, all twenty-two defend-
ants pled "not guilty."'4 3 President Lawrence then swiftly called upon Chief
Prosecutor Robert Jackson to begin his opening statement. 44
"That four great nations," Jackson intoned, "flushed with victory and
stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their
captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant
tributes that Power has ever paid to reason."'45 Jackson's famous remark to
open the Nuremberg Trial was more than powerful rhetoric; it was a delib-
erate response to contemporary critics who challenged the integrity of the
Nuremberg effort.46 In his opening statement, Jackson conceded that the
victors' position called for exceptional temperance and fairness. 47 Yet, he
defended the role of the Tribunal: "Either the victors must judge the van-
quished or we must leave the defeated to judge themselves."4 8 Recognizing
the tough task at hand, Jackson reminded the Tribunal that "the record on
which we judge these defendants today is the record on which history will
judge us tomorrow. 4 9
The prosecution's case-in-chief set out to prove a four-count indict-
ment, which Jackson believed could be accomplished with books and
records. 50 The indictment implicated seven organizations, from the core
Nazi leadership to the Gestapo, 5 1 as well as the individual defendants. 5 2
in the days between Hitler's suicide and German surrender; Alfred Jodl, head of the
German Armed Forces Operations Staff and signatory to Germany's unconditional sur-
render; Joachim von Ribbentrop, Nazi foreign minister and negotiator of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact that facilitated Germany's conquest of Poland; Julius Streicher, Nazi
propagandist; and Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the Gestapo and administrator of the
extermination program. See id.
43. See 1 SPRECHER, supra note 9, at 150.
44. See id.
45. Anderson, supra note 4, at 281 (quoting Justice Robert H. Jackson).
46. See id. The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Harlan F. Stone,
repudiated "Jackson['s] ... high-grade lynching party in Nuremberg." Brown, supra note
8, at 24 (quoting Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone). Senator Robert Taft contended that
"[t]he trial of the vanquished by the victors cannot be impartial, no matter how it is
hedged about with the forms of justice." Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The
Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321,
330 n.34 (1999) (quoting Senator Robert Taft).
47. See 1 SPRECHER, supra note 9, at 153.
48. Id. (quoting Justice Robert H. Jackson).
49. Id.
50. See id. at 154. Count One charged "a common plan or conspiracy to commit...
Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the
Charter." Indictment: International Military Tribunal, in TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 27, 29 (1947) [hereinafter
Nuremberg Indictment]. Count Two alleged Crimes against Peace "in the planning,
preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in viola-
tion of international treaties, agreements, and assurances." Id. at 42. Count Three
charged War Crimes, such as the murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations; the
deportation of civilians for slave labor and other purposes; the plunder of public and
private property; and the Germanization of occupied territories. See id. at 42-65.
Count Four charged Crimes against Humanity, including extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and persecution. Id. at 65-67.
51. See 1 SPRECHER, supra note 9, at 426. "Collectively they were the ultimate reposi-
tories of all power in the Nazi regime; they were not only the most powerful, but the
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All four counts alleged "individual, group, and organization responsibil-
ity."5 3 Relying heavily on contemporaneous documents, 5 4 the prosecution
sought to prove its case by chronicling the Nazi path of aggressive war and
horrendous atrocities. 55 Pursuant to their right to present evidence under
Article 16(e), the defendants offered documents, called witnesses, and indi-
vidually testified. 56 The Nuremberg Charter allowed closing arguments by
the defense and prosecution, as well as final statements by each individual
defendant.5 7 The defense gave closing arguments on behalf of each organi-
zation and each individual defendant. 58 Likewise, the prosecution dedi-
cated a separate closing argument to each defendant and each
organization. 59 The last presentations before the IMT were the final state-
ments of the twenty-one 60 defendants in the dock. 6 1
4. The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal: An Early
Articulation of Modern International Criminal Law
The IMT convicted nineteen of the twenty-two defendants and sen-
tenced twelve of them to death by hanging.6 2 The Tribunal acquitted three
defendants, perhaps to bolster its own legitimacy, 63 but also to distinguish
most vicious organizations in the regime; and they were organizations in which member-
ship was generally voluntary." Id. at 476 (quoting Justice Robert H. Jackson).
52. See generally id. at 489-546.
53. Nuremberg Indictment, supra note 50, at 29-67.
54. See Meltzer, supra note 6, at 26 ("Because of Jackson's policy, the case against the
defendants was proved by documents of their own making .... [T]he German obses-
sion for record keeping made our case.").
55. See generally 1 SPRECHER, supra note 9, at 151-420.
56. See generally 2 DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A PROSECUTOR'S
COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 713-1230 (1999) (detailing the defense's case-in-chief) [here-
inafter 2 SPRECHER].
57. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 24(h)-(j).
58. See, e.g., 2 SPRECHER, supra note 56, at 1232-52, 1266-90 (detailing the closing
arguments for the individual defendants and the accused organizations respectively).
59. See id. at 1253-65, 1291-1308.
60. "On the 17th November 1945 the Tribunal decided to try the defendant
Bormann in his absence .... NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 6, at 2.
61. See 2 SPRECHER, supra note 56, at 1309-27. The final statements ranged from
sober and regretful to defiant and stubborn. Defendant Wilhelm Keitel expressed
remorse: "I would rather choose death than to let myself be drawn into the net of such
pernicious methods." Id. at 1315 (quoting Wilhelm Keitel). In sharp contrast, Rudolf
Hess declared astoundingly: "If I were to begin all over again, I would act just as I have
acted, even if I knew that in the end I should meet a fiery death at the stake." Id. at 1313
(quoting Rudolf Hess).
62. NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 6, at 189-90. Sentenced to death by hanging:
Goering, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, Frank, Frick, Streicher, Sauckel,
Jodi, Seyss-Inquart, and Bormann. See id. Sentenced to prison terms ranging from ten
years to life: Doenitz (ten years), von Neurath (fifteen years), von Schirach (twenty
years), Speer (twenty years), Hess (life), Funk (life), and Raeder (life). See id. Acquitted:
Fritzsche, Schacht, and von Papen. See id. at 166 (Nikitchenko, J., dissenting).
63. Before the Nuremberg Trials began, Justice Robert H. Jackson warned:
The ultimate principle is that you must put no man on trial under the forms of
judicial proceedings if you are not willing to see him freed if not proven guilty.
If you are determined to execute a man in any case, there is no occasion for a
trial; the world yields no respect to courts that are merely organized to convict.
Vol. 41
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between merely reprehensible conduct and punishable criminal acts.6 4
The Nuremberg Judgment firmly established the concept of individual
responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity.6 5 Prior to this
judgment, war crimes did not include atrocities against a government's
own citizens, and international prohibitions on crimes against humanity
did not yet exist. 6 6 The Tribunal tried to avert criticism for ex post facto
application of Article 6 by citing existing international law in support of its
decision, but struggled to find precedent. 6 7 The judgment cited Article 46
of the Hague Convention of 1899, which stated: "Family honor and rights,
the lives of persons and private property, as well as religious convictions
and practice must be respected. '68 The shift from Article 46 of the Hague
Convention to Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter broadened existing
law6 9 by empowering the Tribunal to punish individuals for committing
"inhumane acts ... against any civilian population, before or during the
war."70 Notwithstanding criticism based on the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege, 71 "Nuremberg's single most important contribution ... was to
give legitimacy to the concept that the world had something to say about
how governments treat their own citizens."'72
In one sense, the judgment at Nuremberg earned instant positive rec-
ognition among the post-war international community. Immediately fol-
lowing the Nuremberg Judgment, the United Nations General Assembly, in
its First Session, adopted Resolution 95(l), which "[a]ffirm[ed] the princi-
Wanda M. Akin, Nuremberg, Justice and the Beast of Impunity, in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS,
supra note 4, at 257, 257 (quoting Justice Robert H. Jackson).
64. See NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 6, at 153 ("To carry through this plan [to
strengthen the Austrian Nazis] he engaged in both intrigue and bullying. But the Char-
ter does not make criminal such offenses against political morality, however bad these
may be. Under the Charter von Papen can be held guilty only if he was a party to the
planning of progressive war.").
65. See NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 6, at 3-4.
66. See Tina Rosenberg, Tipping the Scales of Justice, in WAR CRIMES, supra note 6, at
276, 280 (noting that, before Nuremberg, war crimes law did not cover atrocities against
a government's own citizens and "[i]nternational prohibitions on crimes against human-
ity had not yet been written").
67. See Herv Ascensio, The French Perspective, in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note
4, at 39, 42 (explaining that the Tribunal's French member, Donnedieu de Vabres,
believed that the definition of crimes against humanity was "posterior to the facts" and
"contrary to the principle on non-retroactivity").
68. NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 6, at 62 (quoting Laws of War: Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land (Hague 1I), art. 46 (July 29, 1899)).
69. See Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 280 (noting that existing legal structures did not
exist to cope with bureaucratic mass murder).
70. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 6(c).
71. Justice Jackson argued that the character of international law at the time of the
Nuremberg trial precluded strict application of the principle of retroactivity. See Melt-
zer, supra note 6, at 23. International law was a primitive system, argued Jackson,
dependent on case-by-case development. See id. Jackson drew analogy to the earliest
common law, which simultaneously declared the criminality of certain shocking
offenses and punished the offender. See id.
72. Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 281.
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ples of international law recognized by . . .the [Nuremberg] Tribunal." 73
This Resolution was one of many post-war manifestations of an interna-
tional consensus in support of the principles that came out of
Nuremberg. 74
In fact, the very formation of the United Nations during the summer
of 1945-under a Charter that set parameters for the use of force by Mem-
ber States-confirms that Nuremberg articulated novel but valid principles
of international law. 75 Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter declares,
"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered."' 76 Article 2(4) further obligates Members to "refrain... from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state."' 77
The United Nations took several additional steps that validated the
Nuremberg proceedings. The next resolution that the General Assembly
passed, Resolution 96(l), "affirm[ed] that genocide is a crime under inter-
national law."'78 General Assembly Resolution 260(111), adopted in Decem-
ber 1948, further declared that "genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law [that Member
States must] ... prevent and... punish."79 That same month, the General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 3 of
which affirmed: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of per-
son."80 Moreover, in 1947, the General Assembly directed the United
Nations International Law Commission to formulate and compile the prin-
ciples that emerged from the Nuremberg Charter and the Tribunal's judg-
73. G.A. Res. 95 (1), at 188, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (Dec.
11, 1946).
74. See Benjamin Ferencz, Nuremberg: A Prosecutor's Perspective, in WAR CRIMES,
supra note 6, at 32, 35 (describing how "the outrage ... evoked by these trials immedi-
ately brought forth" several responses from the United Nations).
75. See Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 276 (stating that Nuremberg's punishment of
government officials for crimes against peace coincided with the formation of a new
international institution that proscribed such crimes).
76. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
77. Id. art. 2, para. 4. The Charter provides for only two exceptions to the "compre-
hensive prohibition of the use or threat of force." SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CON-
QUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 200
(1996). The first exception is the collective use of force sanctioned by the Security
Council pursuant to Articles 39 and 42 of the Charter. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42.
The second exception is the right of individual and collective self-defense in the event of
"an armed attack.., against a Member," but only on an interim basis, until the Security
Council takes measures "necessary to maintain international peace and security." Id.
art. 51.
78. G.A. Res. 96 (I), at 189, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, U.N. Doc A/64/Add. 1 (Dec.
11, 1946).
79. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A.
Res. 260 (111), art. 1, Annex, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 9, 1948).
80. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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ment.81 In response, a 1950 Commission Report formulated principles of
international law based on the Nuremberg Judgment. 82
The UN resolutions and instruments of international law adopted in
the wake of the Nuremberg Trials set the course for modern international
law regarding aggressive war and state crimes against civilians.8 3 The
United Nations adopted the principles and other declarations of the
Nuremberg Trials and gave the trials a lasting legitimacy. 8 4 Yet, neither the
United Nations Charter nor the organization's early resolutions created an
international criminal court for purposes of enforcement. 85 As Eleanor
Roosevelt ominously asserted, it remained to be seen "whether a mere
statement of rights, without legal obligations, would inspire governments
to see that these rights are enforced."8 6
B. The Tokyo Trials: Parallel Proceedings in the "Far East"
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) derived
its authority from the terms of Japan's surrender. According to the Instru-
ment of Surrender, "the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ... will
take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surren-
der."' 87 One of the terms of surrender, as articulated in the Potsdam Decla-
ration, was the Allies' authority to bring the Japanese war criminals to
justice. 8 8 Accordingly, General Douglas MacArthur unilaterally estab-
lished the IMTFE by special proclamation in January 194689 and indepen-
81. See G.A. Res. 177 (II), U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov. 21,
1947).
82. Formulation of the Nurnberg Principles, 11950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 181,
191-93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22.
83. See Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 276 (noting that, after Nuremberg, the United
Nations emerged along with "a host of new conventions and declarations protecting
human rights"); Wise, supra note 22, at 59.
84. See generally G.A. Res. 95 (1), supra note 73.
85. See 2 SPRECHER, supra note 56, at 1445 (noting that the UN "resolutions did not
address the crucial matter of creating a permanent structure for the enforcement of' the
principles of the Nuremberg Tribunals); cf. Farhad Malekian, Emasculating the Philoso-
phy of International Criminal Justice in the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L LJ.
673, 685 (2005) ("The refusal to create an international criminal court in the United
Nations Charter was due to monopolization of the vocabulary of true international jus-
tice by those who were and are responsible for the maintenance of international peace,
security, and equality of states.").
86. 2 SPRECHER, supra note 56, at 1448 (quoting Eleanor Roosevelt).
87. Instrument of Surrender c 8, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733, 139 U.N.T.S. 387,
reprinted in 3 THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR
EAST (I.M.T.F.E.) 29 APRIL 1946-12 NOVEMBER 1948 annex A-2 (B.V.A. R61ing & C.F.
Ruter eds., 1977) [hereinafter 3 TOKYO JUDGMENT].
88. See Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, 10, July 26, 1945,
reprinted in 3 ToKYo JUDGMENT, supra note 87, at annex A-1 [hereinafter Potsdam
Declaration].
89. See Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal
for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589. General MacArthur is the sole signa-
tory to the Special Proclamation. See id.
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dently approved its Charter. 90 In this way, the formation of the IMTFE
stands in contrast to that of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which was estab-
lished by an agreement among four allied nations.9 1 In both cases, how-
ever, the state was the preeminent political unit: the Nuremberg Charter
required one state's surrender and negotiations among victorious states,
while the IMTFE Charter required one state's surrender and another state's
unilateral actions.9 2 Article 5 of the IMTFE Charter is the equivalent to
Nuremberg Charter Article 6; it defines the IMTFE's jurisdiction over per-
sons and offenses. 93 The IMTFE Charter gave the IMTFE jurisdiction over
"Far Eastern war criminals who as individuals or as members of organiza-
tions are charged with" Crimes against Peace, Conventional War Crimes,
and Crimes against Humanity. 94 Like the Nuremberg Charter, the IMTFE
Charter incorporated a theory of criminal conspiracy.95 One noteworthy
distinction between the two charters' offense definitions is their respective
definitions of war crimes. The Nuremberg Charter sought to expand the
notion of war crimes to include crimes against a government's own civilian
population.9 6 Conversely, the IMTFE Charter limited the Tribunal's juris-
diction to "conventional" war crimes.9 7 The United States' particular con-
tempt for Japan's mistreatment of American prisoners of war offers a
partial explanation for this difference.98
The Tokyo Trial concerned the fates of eighty defendants charged as
"Class A war criminals" with "Crimes against Peace." 99 After two years of
90. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS 39,
44 (1946) [hereinafter IMTFE Charter] ("By command of General MacArthur").
91. See discussion of the London Agreement, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
92. Compare IMTFE Charter, supra note 90, art. 5, with Nuremberg Charter, supra
note 25, art. 6.
93. Compare IMTFE Charter, supra note 90, art. 5, with Nuremberg Charter, supra
note 25, art. 6.
94. IMTFE Charter, supra note 90, art. 5. The IMTFE Charter defines the crimes as
follows:
a. Crimes against Peace: Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of interna-
tional law, treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
b. Conventional War Crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war;
c. Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popula-
tion, before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tri-




96. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 6.
97. See IMTFE Charter, supra note 90, art. 5(b).
98. See Potsdam Declaration, supra note 88, 9 10 ("[S]tern justice shall be meted out
to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.").
99. See TIM MAGA, JUDGMENT AT ToKYo: THE JAPANESE WAR CRIMES TRIALS 2-3 (2001).
The suspects included premiers (Hiranuma, Tojo, Hirota, Koiso); foreign ministers (Mat-
suoka, Shigemitsu, Togo); war ministers (Araki, Itagaki, Hata, Minami); navy ministers
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trial and several months of deliberation, the IMTFE found that the prosecu-
tion had proven that the defendants had participated in a conspiracy to
wage aggressive war, and that all defendants-aside from two who died
during trial and one who was declared unfit to stand trial-were guilty for
their part in the conspiracy.' 0 0 Seven defendants were put to death, while
others faced prison sentences ranging from seven years to life. l 0 '
The Tokyo indictment is notorious not for whom it included, but for
whom it excluded. Although Hitler escaped judgment at Nuremberg by
taking his own life, Emperor Hirohito enjoyed immunity from prosecu-
tion.10 2 Regarding Emperor Hirohito's immunity, General MacArthur
believed that "if he [were] to be tried ...his indictment [would have]
unquestionably cause[d] a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese
people, the repercussions of which cannot be over-estimated."'1 3 With
these political aims in mind, the United States took extensive measures to
protect Hirohito and the Japanese royal family. 10 4 The sparing of Hirohito
and the Japanese royal family undoubtedly contradicted Nuremberg's rejec-
tion of official immunity. 10 5 Therefore, immunity for Emperor Hirohito
arguably harmed the legacy of the Tokyo Tribunal.106
Nonetheless, a key concept in international criminal law-"command
responsibility"-originated at the Tokyo Tribunal. 10 7 Japanese General
Yamashita's death sentence rested on an omission offense; he allowed his
(Shimada, Nagano); generals (Koihara, Kimura, Matsui, Muto, Umezu, Sato); ambassa-
dors (Shiratori, Oshima); economic decisionmakers (Hoshino, Suzuki, Kaya); and an
imperial advisor (Kido); among others. See id. Subsequent tribunals administered by
the United States tried Class B war criminals for conventional war crimes and Class C
war criminals for crimes against humanity. See Timothy Brook, The Tokyo Judgment and
the Rape of Nanking, 60 J. ASIAN STUD. 673, 674 n.3 (2001).
100. See Zhang Wanhong, From Nuremberg to Tokyo: Some Reflections on the Tokyo
Trial (On the Sixteenth Anniversary of the Nuremberg Trials), 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1673,
1674-75 (2006).
101. See id. at 1675.
102. See id.
103. Kerry Creque O'Neill, Note, A New Customary Law of Head of State Immunity?:
Hirohito and Pinochet, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 289, 302 (2002) (quoting General Douglas
MacArthur).
104. See id. at 301-02. The pervasive racism of the time period may also have con-
tributed to MacArthur's decision not to prosecute Hirohito. See id at 303-05. MacAr-
thur's belief that Hirohito's immunity was necessary to the stability of post-war Japan
might have been motivated by a prevailing stereotype of Japanese as childlike followers
in need of a father-figure. See id. See generally JOHN DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE
AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR (1986).
105. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 7.
106. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Perennial Conflict Between International Crimi-
nal justice and Realpolitik, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 554 (2006) ("MacArthur had more
concern about governing Japan than prosecuting Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Japan's
head of state thus escaped responsibility. ... ); Wanhong, supra note 100, at 1675
(Japan fought World War II in the name of the Emperor, and there is abundant evidence
pointing to the fact that the Emperor himself was aware of the Imperial Army's atrocities
in the war.").
107. See MOGHALU, supra note 8, at 65.
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troops to commit atrocities.'0 8 The prosecution could not prove that the
General had actual knowledge of the crimes that his subordinates commit-
ted. 10 9 Instead, the Tribunal reasoned that the crimes were so widespread
and conspicuous that General Yamashita must have either secretly ordered
them or must have been aware of their commission. 110 The doctrine of
command responsibility would later prove important in the trials of
Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein. 1 11
The multilateralism and compromise among the Allies at Nuremberg
was conspicuously absent in Tokyo. 1 2 The United States single-handedly
applied the military force necessary to secure Japan's surrender. 1 3 The
United States' military commander in the Pacific unilaterally approved the
Tribunal's governing instruments and appointed the Tribunal's judges.114
The overarching U.S. goal in Japan was to mold the former enemy into a
Cold War ally, and immunity for Hirohito went hand-in-hand with that
agenda.1 15 The Tokyo Trial, therefore, has been interpreted largely as real-
politik 1 6 in disguise as justice. 1 7 Although the United Nations embraced
the principles that emerged from Nuremberg, the IMTFE is still searching
for its "proper legacy." 1 18 This situation reflects the respective roles of
states and international bodies. The role of the United Nations was to
either legitimize or distance itself from state action. 119 In the case of the
Tokyo Trials, the United Nations chose to keep its distance. 1 20
108. See Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of
Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 619, 622-23
(2007) (stating that an omission offense involves a dereliction of the superior's duty to
control, prevent, or punish).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See MOGHALU, supra note 8, at 65; Michael Louis Minns, A Brief History of Willful-
ness as It Applies to the Body of American Criminal Tax Law, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 395, 396
n.9 (2007).
112. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accounta-
bility Over Realpolitih, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 191, 196 (2003) ("The original Nurem-
berg tribunal was a product of the London Treaty of August 8, 1945, which was signed
by four countries and acceded to by nineteen others. In the Far East, on the other hand,
the tribunal's foundation rested on General MacArthur's proclamation ....").
113. See WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY: AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR 11
56 (5th ed. 2003) (quoting Japanese military expert who said that if bomb had not been
dropped, "we would have fought until all 80 million Japanese were dead"); MOGHALU,
supra note 8, at 47.
114. See Bassiouni, supra note 112, at 196.
115. See id. at 196-97 ("[Tihe United States had based its future Southeast Asia pol-
icy on Japan's stability and strength, and it was important that the Japanese not feel
humiliated by the consequences of World War 1I.").
116. Id. at 191 ("Realpolitik involves the pursuit of political settlements unencum-
bered by moral and ethical limitations.").
117. See id. at 196 ("While the Nuremburg tribunal is widely viewed as a major histor-
ical step in the evolution of international norms of accountability, the Tokyo tribunal
reveals how adjudicative bodies can be used to support realpolitik.").
118. See MAGA, supra note 99, at 140 (noting that "[a] minimum of... world political
attention had been paid to the Tokyo effort as compared to that in Nuremberg").
119. See David Tolbert & Andrew Solomon, United Nations Reform and Supporting the
Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies, 19 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 29, 40 (2006).
120. See MAGA, supra note 99, at xiii.
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C. The United Nations Takes a More Prominent Role in Post-Conflict
Justice: Ad Hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal
Court
Between 1950 and 1990, the international community effectively
shelved the Nuremberg Charter and did not convene a single international
tribunal despite the commission of many chargeable crimes. 12 1 The Cold
War power politics between the United States and the Soviet Union did not
leave much room for legal accountability for acts and policies defined as
crimes. 12 2 The fall of the Soviet Union and removal of communist influ-
ence throughout Europe in the 1990s seemed to promise renewed interna-
tional cooperation fueled by Western democracy and capitalism.123
In the midst of what appeared to be a moment of progress, however,
gross and systematic human rights violations were taking place in the for-
mer Yugoslavia. 12 4 Unlike the leaders of Nazi Germany and Imperial
Japan, however, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic seemed focused only on
regional domination; Serbia did not pose a military threat to the United
States or its peers on the Security Council. 125 Thus, rather than mobilize a
military intervention, 126 the Security Council began a barrage of resolu-
tions and fact-findings -eventually developing an international tribunal.12 7
121. See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 17 (1995) (commenting that
developments in Yugoslavia "impelled the Security Council to finally dust off the forty-
five year old Nuremberg Charter") [hereinafter 1 MORRIS & SCHARF]; Diane F. Oren-
tlicher, A Half Century of Silence: The Politics of Law, in WAR CRIMES, supra note 6, at 107,
107 ("[P]olitical factors ... account for the world's failure to convene an international
tribunal for world-class criminals in the half-century following Nuremberg.").
122. See Jeremy Rabkin, Global Criminal Justice: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 38
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 753, 758 (2005) (noting the "general atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust between the superpowers (and their respective allies) during the Cold War");
Geoffrey Robertson, Ending Impunity: How International Criminal Law Can Put Tyrants
on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 649, 656 (2005) ("It was doubtless due to Cold War
realpolitik that no head of state was held responsible in international law" after
Nuremberg.).
123. See Rabkin, supra note 122, at 758 & n.16 (describing the 1990s as a time when
"[elverything seemed possible," the World Bank announced a "Washington Consensus,"
and Fukuyama predicted the end of history).
124. See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 121, at 21. Serbian forces used methods
evoking Nazi Europe: forced population transfers in cattle trucks, organized massacres,
and over 400 detention centers where Bosnian Muslims were tortured and killed. See id.
at 22. By 1993, forces led by Radovan Karadzic and Slobodan Milosevic had killed or
displaced 2.1 million Bosnians. See id.
125. See Rabkin, supra note 122, at 761 (noting that the Clinton administration was
adverse to sending troops to the Balkans after American troops had been lost during a
humanitarian mission in Somalia).
126. See MOGHALU, supra note 8, at 63 ("[Tlhe great powers were clearly unwilling to
go to such lengths to support international justice.").
127. For an account of the various Security Council resolutions in response to the
Yugoslav conflict, see 1 MoRRIs & SCtARF, supra note 121, at 22-35. Resolution 764
declared that parties to the conflict must follow international law. See id. at 22. Resolu-
tion 771 demanded cessation of violations of international law. See id. Resolution 780
expressed alarm and called for a Commission of Experts to assess the situation. See id.
at 24-25. Four months later, the Commission confirmed that serious breaches had
occurred and suggested that the Security Council or another competent UN organ form
Cornell International Law Journal
On May 23, 1993, the Security Council adopted the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 1 28 pursuant to
its authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
129
The jurisdiction of the ICTY extends over all "persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the ter-
ritory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991."130 The ICTY has jurisdiction
concurrent with that of national courts, but "shall have primacy over
national courts," meaning that the ICTY can request that national courts
defer to its competence.1 3 ' The ICTY Statute covers "grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions" of 1949,132 violations of the laws or customs of
war, 133 genocide, 134 and crimes against humanity.
135
The crimes defined in the ICTY Statute were conceived of, in similar
language, as early as the Nuremberg Charter13 6 and were "beyond doubt
customary international law" by 1993.137 Thus, according to its propo-
nents, the ICTY Statute does not violate the fundamental principle of nul-
lum crimen sine lege.138 The ICTY Statute's provisions regarding individual
criminal responsibility were also in line with precedent. Like the Nurem-
berg Charter, the ICTY Statute declares that the official position of any
accused person "shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor
mitigate punishment"'139 and that "[tihe fact that an accused person acted
pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him
of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punish-
ment."140 Unlike the Nuremberg Charter, however, the ICTY Statute does
an ad hoc tribunal. See id. at 28-29. Motivated by insistence from the United States, the
Security Council passed Resolution 808 in which it decided to form a tribunal and
requested the Secretary General to prepare proposals. See id. at 31. In response, the
Secretary General issued a report and attached a draft statute that would incorporate
international criminal law and views of interested states and organizations into the tri-
bunal. See id. at 32-33. "Expressing once again its grave alarm," the Security Council
passed Resolution 827 and adopted the Statute of the International Tribunal proposed
by the Secretary General without change, marking the birth of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. See S.C. Res. 827, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 121, at 33.
128. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May
25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
129. U.N. Charter art. 39. The Security Council holds the power to "determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and...
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . .to maintain or
restore international peace and security." Id.
130. ICTY Statute, supra note 128, art. 1.
131. Id. art. 9(1)-(2).
132. Id. art. 2.
133. See id. art. 3.
134. See id. art. 4.
135. See id. art. 5.
136. Compare id. arts. 2-5, with Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 6.
137. 1 MoRs & SCHARF, supra note 121, at 51-52.
138. See id. at 52 & n.177 (characterizing nullum crimen sine lege as the principle that
one cannot be guilty for an act or omission that was not criminal at the time it was, or
was not, done).
139. ICTY Statute, supra note 128, art. 7(2).
140. Id. art. 7(4).
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not permit imposition of the death penalty.
141
Slobodan Milosevic's first act as a criminal defendant at The Hague
was one of defiance: he refused to appoint defense counsel. 14 2 In a trial
that began in February 2002, Milosevic faced charges of crimes against
humanity and war crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and
violations of the laws and customs of war. 14 3 Unlike the Nuremberg prose-
cution, in which the defendants' own documents proved their guilt,144 the
ICTY prosecution found little or no direct evidence of Milosevic's involve-
ment in the vicious crimes perpetrated during his rule.' 4 5 Thus, the indict-
ment embraced concepts of conspiracy from the American prosecution at
Nuremberg, alleging Milosevic's participation as a "co-perpetrator" in a
"joint criminal enterprise.' 1 46 The prosecution also utilized the concept of
command responsibility, which provided a path to Milosevic's guilt if the
crimes of his subordinates could be proven. 147 The charges mounted
against Milosevic did not lead to a conviction.' 4 8 Instead, the proceedings
dragged on for four years due to his ill health and filibustering tactics, and
the trial abruptly ended when Milosevic died on March 11, 2006.149
Has impunity come to the rescue of other high-level officials tried by
ad hoc tribunals of the UN? An examination of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) suggests that this is largely the case. Between
April 6 and July 17, 1994, approximately 800,000 Rwandans were mas-
sacred15 0 as part of a pre-planned government campaign. 1 5 1 The interna-
tional community did not intervene militarily to stop the genocide; rather,
the Security Council ordered the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces.
1 52
The genocide halted only when an invading army took control of the
Rwandan militarily on July 17, 1994 and formed a new government.
153
Once again, institution-building began at the state level as the international
community looked on. The international community became involved
141. Compare id. art. 24(1), with Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 27.
142. See MOGHALU, supra note 8, at 67.
143. See id. at 64.
144. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nuremberg
prosecution tactics.
145. See MOGHALU, supra note 8, at 64.
146. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. 11-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment, 1 5
(July 28, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-2ai020
728e.htm.
147. See MOGHALJ, supra note 8, at 65.
148. See id. at 70-72.
149. See id. at 67-69. During his self-representation, Milosevic sought to win over
public opinion back home in Serbia during the televised proceedings, delivering political
speeches that had little to do with the forensic trial. See Michael P. Scharf, Chaos in the
Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in War Crimes
Trials, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 155, 161-62 (2007). His tactics were quite effective in
turning Serbian public opinion in his favor and in foreclosing a timely conviction. Id.
150. See KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, RWANDA'S GENOCIDE 1 (2005) [hereinafter
RWANDA'S GENOCIDE].
151. See Madeline H. Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide. Rwanda, in WAR CRIMES,
supra note 6, at 211, 211-12.
152. See Rabkin, supra note 122, at 762.
153. See Morris, supra note 151, at 212; Rabkin, supra note 122, at 763.
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only after the military conflict had quieted. 15 4 The Security Council began
investigations and negotiations with the government of Rwanda with the
goal of creating an ad hoc tribunal to handle a portion of the more than
100,000 cases arising from the Rwandan genocide. 155 As was the case
with the ICTY, the Security Council acted pursuant to its Chapter VII peace
enforcement powers.15 6 The ICTR came into existence pursuant to Secur-
ity Council Resolution 955,157 passed by the vote of thirteen of fifteen
Members. 15 8 China abstained, and Rwanda-coincidentally a Security
Council Member at the time-cast the sole dissenting vote. i 5 9
Like the ICTY, the ICTR has primacy over national courts, which
means its law-not Rwandan law-will apply to the defendants it tries. 160
Rwanda wanted its domestic legal culture to feature prominently in the
ICTR Statute; however, disagreement arose over the structure of the
ICTR. 16 1 The ICTR Statute, for instance, prohibited the death penalty
despite its place in Rwanda's domestic criminal code. 162 Thus, if the ICTR
pursued defendants from the previous regime's top leadership, these lead-
ers would escape the death penalty, face prison conditions superior to
those in Rwanda, and enjoy the belabored process of international justice
illustrated most prominently by the Milosevic trial. 163
In the case of Iraq, the threat of a veto from a Permanent Member of
the Security Council probably foreclosed the possibility of an ad hoc tribu-
nal. 164 Additionally, the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)
was not a possible forum for trying Saddam Hussein. 165 The ICC is the
product of a multilateral treaty negotiated in Rome in 1998.166 Less than
half of the 189 UN Member States have ratified the treaty. 16 7 The ICC
does not have temporal jurisdiction over crimes that occurred before July
154. See Morris, supra note 151, at 213-15.
155. See id.
156. See RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, supra note 150, at 31.
157. S.C. Res. 955, '1 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
158. See RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, supra note 150, at 31.
159. See id.
160. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, supra note
157, Annex, art. 8(2) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
161. See Morris, supra note 151, at 213-15.
162. See id. at 214-15.
163. See id. at 219.
164. See Interview by Renee Montagne with Michael Scharf, Professor, Case W.
Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law (Nov. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with Michael Scharf]
audio available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=6441761.
165. See id.
166. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/STATUTE/99-corr/cstatute.htm; Ruth Wedgwood, The
International Criminal Court: Reviewing the Case, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 81, 82 (William Driscoll et al. eds., 2003).
167. See Wedgwood, supra note 166, at 82. India, Japan, China, Egypt, Israel, Russia,
and the United States have not ratified the Rome statute. See id. at 82-83. The United
States' opposition to the ICC stems largely from its concern that the Court's broadly-
defined subject matter jurisdiction could be used as a political tool to challenge U.S.
policies. See id. at 82-83.
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1, 2002,168 and therefore could not have tried Saddam Hussein whose
crimes were alleged to have been committed before that date.
16 9
The ICC, like the ICTY and the ICTR, has subject matter jurisdiction
over crimes whose definitions have their origin at Nuremberg: war
crimes, 170 crimes against humanity, 17 1 genocide, 172 and the crime of
aggression. 173 Proponents of the ICC have described it as "a permanent
court of universal jurisdiction,"'17 4 signaling a paradigm shift in interna-
tional law towards a "supranational structure."'175 The reach of ICC juris-
diction is controversial; the Court can prosecute any statutory crime
committed in the territory of a State Party, even if those crimes were com-
mitted by a national of a non-State Party, such as the United States. 176 The
ICC may also prosecute a national of any State Party, regardless of where
the crime was committed.' 7 7 However, significant opposition by major
powers such as the United States, China, and India calls into question the
future relevance of the ICC. 1 7 8 Additionally, the ICC's early setbacks illus-
trate the preeminence of states. The ICC's authority to set binding prece-
dent will continue to depend on ratification at the state level.
II. Application of International and Iraqi Criminal Law at the Trial of
Saddam Hussein
The Statute of the IHT largely comports with international precedent,
but includes features that reflect the national character of the Tribunal.
Professor Michael Scharf has commented that "the IHT is not fully interna-
tional or even international enough to be dubbed a hybrid court, since its
seat is Baghdad, its Prosecutor is Iraqi, it uses the Iraqi Criminal Code to
supplement the provisions of its statute and rules, and its bench is com-
168. See Rome Statute, supra note 166, art. 11(1) ("The Court has jurisdiction only
with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute.").
169. See Interview with Michael Scharf, supra note 164.
170. See Rome Statute, supra note 166, art. 8.
171. See id. art. 7.
172. See id. art. 6. Though the crime of genocide was not articulated as a separate
crime in the Nuremberg Charter, it was mentioned by Nuremberg prosecutors under the
auspice of crimes against humanity. See William Driscoll, Introduction, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE, supra note 166, at
11, 14.
173. See Rome Statute, supra note 166, art. 5. The Rome Statute does not define the
crime of aggression, instead it stipulates that a definition will be worked out and incor-
porated at a later date. See id. This strange provision reflects the inability of delegates to
agree on a definition for the crime of aggression. See Driscoll, supra note 172, at 15.
174. HANS KOCHLER, GLOBAL JUSTICE OR GLOBAL REVENGE?: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 186 (2003).
175. Id. at 185.
176. See Driscoll, supra note 172, at 15-16.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 14-22. The United States has used "Article 98 Agreements" to prevent
the ICC from reaching its nationals. See id. at 21. Article 98 of the Rome Statute stipu-
lates that the ICC cannot force a state to surrender an accused person if tie surrender
conflicts with the state's other obligations under international law. See id. The United
States has reached treaties with over seventy countries whereby these countries promise
not to surrender U.S. nationals to the ICC. See id.
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posed exclusively of Iraqi judges."179 Article 1 of the Tribunal's organic
statute explains the IHT's jurisdictional reach:
The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over every natural person, whether Iraqi
or non-Iraqi resident of Iraq, accused of committing any of the crimes listed
in Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14 of this law, committed during the period from
17 July 1968 to 1 May 2003, in the Republic of Iraq or elsewhere, including
the following crimes:
A. Genocide;
B. Crimes against humanity;
C. War crimes; and
D. Violations of Iraqi laws listed in Article 14 of this law.' 8 0
The IHT Statute defines genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes using language derived from the Nuremberg Charter and found in
the statutes of Security Council ad hoc tribunals.' 8 ' In the opinion con-
victing Saddam Hussein, the IHT Trial Chamber further provided that,
179. Michael P. Scharf, Comment, The Iraqi High Tribunal: A Viable Experiment in
International Justice?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 258, 259 (2007).
180. Al-Waqa'i Al-lraqiya [Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq), Law of the Iraqi
Higher Criminal Court, Oct. 18, 2005 No. 4006 2 (Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice
trans.) [hereinafter IHT Statute], available at http://www.ictj.org/static/MENA/Iraq/
iraq.statute.engtrans.pdf.
181. For example, the IHT statute defines "crimes against humanity" as
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic




D. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
E. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental norms of international law;
F. Torture;
G. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, or any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
H. Persecution against any specific party or population on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are imper-
missible under international law, in connection with any act referred to as a
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
I. Enforced disappearance of persons; and
J. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suf-
fering, or serious injury to the body or to the mental or physical health.
Id. at 9 (art. 12). Similarly, the Nuremberg Charter defines "crimes against humanity"
as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecu-
tions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in viola-
tion of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, art. 6(c); see also ICTY Statute, supra note 128, art. 5
(defining "crimes against humanity" as crimes "committed in armed conflict" that were
"directed against any civilian population: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslave-
ment; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on politi-
cal, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane acts").
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"[t]he evolution of international criminal law bestows legality on the law of
the Iraqi High Tribunal .... -182 The unique aspect of the IHT's subject
matter jurisdiction is that it encompasses the violation of Iraqi laws as
well.18 3 Scharf sees this development as a strength of the IHT, commenting
that "the IHT Statute ... represent[s] a novel attempt to blend international
standards of due process with Middle Eastern legal traditions.' 18 4
The amended IHT Statute includes provisions on rights of the
accused, but rescinds the right to conduct one's own defense, which was
featured in the original 2003 Statute. 18 5 To what extent does this limita-
tion on the procedural rights of the accused depart from precedent? In
2006, the ICTY revoked Serbian leader Vojislav Seselj's right to self-repre-
sentation in light of his disruptive behavior and because of the lessons
learned from the hijacked Milosevic proceedings. 186 If the goal is to ensure
a fair trial, rules ensuring the defendant's right to be informed of the
charges against him, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses are far
more important than the right to represent oneself.18 7 The IHT Statute,
like its predecessors, provides for these safeguards. 188 With provisions on
182. Al-Dujail Lawsuit, Case No. 1/9 First/2005, Trial Court Judgment, reprinted in
39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1 app. A at 44 (2006) [hereinafter Al-Dujail Trial Chamber
Opinion].
183. For example, article 14 of the IHT Statute asserts:
The Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons who have committed the
following crimes under Iraqi law:
First: Interference in the affairs of the judiciary or attempting to influence its
Tu--ntio ning.
Second: The wastage and squandering of national resources pursuant, to Article
2(g) oFthe Punishment of Conspirators against Public Safety and Corrupters of
the System of Governance Law Number 7 of 1958.
Third: The abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that [may lead to] the
threat of war or the use of the Iraqi armed forces against an Arab country, in
accordance with Article 1 of Law 7 of 1958.
IHT Statute, supra note 180, at 15.
184. See Scharf, supra note 179, at 259.
185. See Scharf, supra note 149, at 163 ("On August 11, 2005 the . . . Assembly
replaced the clause providing for a right of self-representation with a clause that said
that all defendants before the Tribunal had to be represented by Iraqi Counsel, who
could be assisted by foreign lawyers."); Michael P. Scharf, Self-Representation Versus
Assignment of Defence Counsel Before International Criminal Tribunals, 4 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 31, 46 n.89 (2006).
186. See Scharf, supra note 149, at 162; see also Mark S. Ellis, The Saddam Trial: Chal-
lenges to Meeting International Standards of Fairness with Regard to the Defense, 39 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 171, 171-75 (2007) (identifying precedent for disallowing self-
representation).
187. See Ellis, supra note 186, at 172-75 (discussing the qualified nature of the right
to counsel).
188. For example, article 19 of the IHT Statue provides that,
First: All persons shall be equal before the Tribunal.
Second: The accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty before the
TriFunal in accordance with this law.
Third: Every accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, in accordance with
i provisions of this law and the rules of procedure made hereunder.
Fourth: When bringing charges against the accused pursuant to this Law, the
acs shall be entitled to a fair impartial trial in accordance with the following
minimum guarantees:
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jurisdiction, substantive crimes, and procedural rights, the IHT stood
ready to try Saddam Hussein.
Scharf, who was involved in the training of judges and prosecutors for
the Iraqi High Tribunal, has called the trial of Saddam Hussein "more or
less an open and shut case." 18 9 Likening the trial to the proceedings at
Nuremberg, Scharf points to "a public record of . ..atrocities" 190 and
extensive "knowledge of ... involvement"'19 1 to suggest that a guilty verdict
under prevailing international criminal law was never really in doubt.19 2
Likewise, Professor Jonathan Drimmer has argued that, notwithstanding
the debate over procedural defects at the IHT, "the ultimate verdict ...
certainly is consistent with the evidence presented."' 19 3
The trial of Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants covered measures
taken by Hussein's government between 1982 and 1985 against the people
of the Iraqi town of Dujail, which is located sixty kilometers north of Bagh-
dad. 1 9 4 On July 8, 1982, gunshots rang out during a presidential proces-
sion in Dujail. 1 95  Soon after the gunshots fired, military forces
surrounded the town and Saddam Hussein charged his brother with the
mission of responding to the perceived threat. 196 Within minutes, shelling
from warplanes and helicopters had killed nine Dujail residents. 197 Sad-
dam Hussein "insisted on the revenge and harm [sic] as many people of
A. To be informed promptly and in detail of the content, nature and cause of
the charge against him;
B. To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and
to communicate freely with counsel of his own choosing and to meet with
him in private. The accused is entitled to have non-Iraqi legal representation
so long as the principal lawyer of such accused is Iraqi;
C. To be tried without undue delay;
D. To be tried in his presence, and to be assisted by counsel of his own choos-
ing, or to be informed of his right to request legal assistance if he cannot
afford it; and to have the right to seek such assistance that will allow him to
appoint a lawyer without paying the fees;
E. To have the right to call and examine defence [sic] and prosecution wit-
nesses, and to present any evidence in his defense in accordance with the
law[; and]
F. Not to be compelled to confess guilt, and to have the right to remain silent
and not to testify without such silence being interpreted as evidence of guilt or
innocence[.]
IHT Statute, supra note 180, at 19.




193. Julia Preston, Hussein Trial Was Flawed But Reasonably Fair, and Verdict Was Jus-
tified, Legal Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at AlO (quoting Jonathan Drimmer).
194. See Christopher M. Rassi, Lessons Learned From the Iraqi High Tribunal: The Need
For an International Independent Investigation, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 215, 215
(2007).
195. See A1-Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 182, at 7 (referring to "the 10 to
12 gunshots (Kalashnikov gunshots) from behind the fence of one of the gardens on the
presidential procession in Al Dujail on 7/8/1982").
196. See id. at 7-8.
197. See id. at 8.
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th[e] town as possible." 19 8 Iraqi forces initially detained 1000 Dujali
residents and ultimately killed 143.199 Following mass detentions in
deplorable conditions of torture, 20 0 Hussein's Revolutionary Court hastily
sentenced 148 Dujail residents to death. 20 1 Saddam Hussein subsequently
"knowingly and with design summarily approved the execution of the
death sentences.
20 2
For his vicious, indiscriminate response to the incident in Dujail, the
IHT convicted Saddam Hussein of crimes against humanity under Article
12 of the IHT Statute, and of premeditated murder under the Iraqi Penal
Code. 20 3 The IHT followed international precedent by evoking the doc-
trine of command responsibility. 20 4 Regarding Hussein's liability, the Tri-
bunal declared: "In your capacity as the Supreme head of the ruling
Revolutionary Command Council, President of the Republic, the Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and in view of your high responsibil-
ity, you are directly responsible for crimes committed against those victims
and their families."2 0 5 The IHT placed great emphasis on Hussein's
authorization of execution orders that he handed down without a shred of
due process by a corrupt Iraqi court.20 6 With this action, the IHT set solid
precedent for future tribunals looking to concretely link government acts
and crimes against humanity.20 7 The IHT also rejected the head-of-state
immunity defense based on reasoning that followed and lucidly elaborated
on international precedent. 20 8 Although Saddam Hussein argued that his
actions were a response to a threat posed by terrorists aligned with Iran in
the Iran-Iraq War,20 9 the tribunal decided that his response was unneces-
sary and disproportionate. 2 10 The conviction was not only supported by
198. Id. at 9.
199. See id. at 136.
200. See, e.g., id. at 150.
201. See id. at 137-38.
202. Id. at 138.
203. See id. at 139. The IHT found Hussein guilty of the following crimes against
humanity: deliberate killing, forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental norms of international
law, torture, coercive disappearance, and other inhumane acts. See Press Release, Int'l
Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Iraq Tribunal Chooses Speed over Justice in Final Ruling:
Lost Opportunity to Solve Flaws of Dujail Case 2 (Dec. 27, 2006), available at http://
www.ictj.org/images/content/6/1/618.pdf. All of these crimes were proven to be "part
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack." See IHT Statute, supra note 180, at 9 (art. 12). The IHT also
convicted Hussein of murder under the Iraqi Penal Code for ordering and approving
executions. See A-Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 182, at 132; see also Penal
Law No. 111 [1969], 9 406(1)(a) (Iraq), available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-
moment-blog/documents/IraqiPenalCode_1969.pdf.
204. See Al-Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 182, at 135, 137.
205. Id. at 135.
206. See, e.g., id. at 110, 138.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., id. at 30, 112-15 (discussing, for example, the case of Milorad Kornylak
in the ICTY).
209. See Scharf, supra note 179, at 261.
210. See id. at 105; see also Michael P. Scharf, Foreword: Lessons From the Saddam
Trial, 39 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2006) ("Saddam's main defense was that as a
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sound reasoning, it was also based on strong evidence. 21 1
III. A Coalition-Created Institution: Assessing the Legitimacy of the
Iraqi High Tribunal
A. Post-Invasion Governance in Iraq
Following the trial of Saddam Hussein, the United States and the
United Kingdom (the Coalition) forcibly removed Hussein from power,
providing the necessary precondition for bringing to trial former Ba'athist
officials who "were responsible for depriving Iraqis of their human rights,
and of virtually extinguishing the real rule of law for over two decades." 2 12
The now-historic image of U.S. Marines tearing down Saddam Hussein's
statue in a Baghdad square to the cheers of Iraqi onlookers 2 13 symbolizes
the IHT's basic claim to legitimacy: the Coalition deposed a tyrant and
delivered him to a victimized nation.2 14 The official website of the IHT
reflects this intuitive idea of legitimacy; it describes the Tribunal's role as
"recognizing the wishes of the Iraqi people to establish a legal instrument
suitable for proving their rights and uncovering the truth about what hap-
pened during the past years in Iraq." 215
Yet to say that the IHT fulfills the Iraqis' desire for retributive justice
only begins to answer the question of the Tribunal's legitimacy. What does
it mean to say that the IHT is or is not legitimate? From what sources does
a newly created tribunal derive its legitimacy? To answer these questions,
this section examines the political developments surrounding post-inva-
sion Iraq and then evaluates those events in light of pertinent ideas on the
legitimacy of new institutions in occupied territories.
In the wake of its victory over Saddam Hussein, the Coalition set out to
fill the power vacuum in Iraq by creating a temporary government-the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). 2 16 In May 2003, President George
leader, he was entitled to take action against a town that had tried to assassinate him...
at a time when Iraq and Iran were at war. The opinion details why the actions taken
against the town of Dujail and its inhabitants 'was not necessary to stop an immediate
and imminent danger' and how the actions were disproportionate to the threat.").
211. See Interview with Michael Sharf, supra note 164 ("Just like the Nazis were con-
victed on the strength of their own documents, so too did Saddam Hussein end up being
convicted largely on the strength of seven documents that beared [sic] his signature and
proved all of the elements of this case.").
212. Michael A. Newton, The Iraqi Special Tribunal: A Human Rights Perspective, 38
CORNELL INT'L I.J. 863, 866 (2005); see Malekian, supra note 85, at 677 (pointing out
that post-invasion justice in Iraq is based on "the burdens of military strength").
213. See Saddam Statue Toppled in Central Baghdad, CNN, Apr. 9, 2003, http://www.
cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/09/sprj.irq.statue.
214. See Newton, supra note 212, at 866 ("The elation that Iraqi citizens expressed as
the statues of Saddam Hussein fell in Baghdad testified to their deep desire for the resto-
ration of a society built on the rule of law rather than one dominated by the whims of a
dictator .. ").
215. Iraqi High Tribunal, Background of the IHT, http://www.iraqihightribunal.org/
en/establishment of the iht.php?idproced=37 (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
216. See Coalition Provisional Authority Reg. No. 1, § 1(1)-(2), CPA/REG/16 May
2003/01 (May 16, 2003) ("The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in
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W. Bush, through Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, appointed L.
Paul Bremer III Administrator of the CPA.2 17 CPA Regulation No. 1, signed
by Bremer on May 16, 2003, spelled out the extensive reach of CPA author-
ity.2 18 Regulation No. 1 not only placed all legislative, executive, and judi-
cial power in Iraq with the CPA, but it also authorized the CPA to issue
regulations and orders superseding existing Iraqi law. 2 19 The CPA's unilat-
eral authority, according to Regulation No. 1, was to "be exercised by the
CPA Administrator. ' 220 To enter into effect, a CPA regulation or order
needed only Bremer's "approval or signature."' 22 1 It has been argued that
Regulation No. 1 made Paul Bremer a temporary dictator of Iraq. 22 2 The
CPA decision-making process "allowed little room for serious internal dis-
cussion or consultation with allies."'223 Through the CPA, the Coalition
attempted to govern Iraq in the immediate aftermath of its invasion by
utilizing a streamlined process in which the Coalition's policies could
translate into Iraqi law. 2 24 The CPA's top-down approach has been called
"paradoxical[ ] for a body supposedly imposing liberal values." 225
In its capacity as the temporary governing authority of Iraq, the CPA
assigned itself the power to create new Iraqi institutions.2 26 Pursuant to
this authority, in July 2006, Administrator Bremer signed into force CPA
Regulation No. 6 which recognized the Coalition-appointed Iraqi Gov-
erning Council (IGC) as "the principal body of the Iraqi interim adminis-
tration."22 7 The IGC included twenty-five Iraqi religious and political
leaders, nine of whom were exiles during the Hussein era, and many of
whom had coordinated with Washington in the lead-up to the invasion. 228
Despite their undeniable importance to Iraqi politics, Shiite clerics who
opposed the U.S.-led occupation and former Ba'athists were conspicuously
order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional
administration .. ").
217. See James Dao & Eric Schmitt, President Picks a Special Envoy to Rebuild Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2003, at Al.
218. See Coalition Provisional Authority Reg. No. 1, § 1(2) ("The CPA is vested with
all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives .... ").
219. See id. § 2 ("Unless suspended or replaced by the CPA... laws in force in Iraq as
of April 16, 2003 shall continue to apply in Iraq .
220. Id. § 1(2).
221. Id. § 3(2).
222. See Dana Michael Hollywood, The Search for Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: A Com-
parative Study of Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Their Applicability to Post-Saddam
Iraq, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 59, 111 (2007) (quoting Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN's Special
Envoy to Iraq, as saying "Mr. Bremer is the dictator of Iraq.").
223. Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and
Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 614 (2006).
224. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 3, 8.
225. Roberts, supra note 223, at 614.
226. See Coalition Provisional Authority Reg. No. 1, § 1(1), CPA/REG/16 May 2003/
01 (May 16, 2003) (declaring that the CPA shall exercise powers of government "to
restore and establish national and local institutions").
227. Coalition Provisional Authority Reg. No. 6, § 1, CPA/REG/13July 2003/06 (July
13, 2003).
228. See Sharon Otterman, Iraq: Iraq's Governing Council, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
May 17, 2004, http://www.cfr.org/publication/7665/.
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absent from the IGC. 229 CPA Regulation No. 6 is ambiguous as to the spe-
cific authority and responsibilities of the IGC, providing only that "the
Governing Council and the CPA shall consult and coordinate on all matters
involving the temporary governance of Iraq, including the authorities of the
Governing Council."'230 Read in conjunction with Regulation No. 1-
which placed all executive, legislative, and judicial power in Iraq with the
CPA-Regulation No. 6 created a figurehead-like body in the IGC, which, to
a large extent, was subordinate to the will of the CPA.2 3 '
The Tribunal that convicted Saddam Hussein began as a creation of
the CPA and IGC, acting pursuant to their respective powers. With CPA
Order No. 48, Administrator Bremer delegated to the IGC the authority "to
establish an Iraqi Special Tribunal ... to try Iraqi nationals or residents of
Iraq accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or viola-
tions of certain Iraqi laws."'2 32 Reflecting the CPA's commitment to coordi-
nate with the IGC, Order No. 48 declared that the statute establishing the
Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) 23 3 was "discussed extensively between the
Governing Council and the CPA." 23 4 Nonetheless, critics quickly accused
the IST of being an illegitimate judicial institution imposed by an occupy-
ing force in contravention of international law.23 5 In August 2005, the
newly-elected Transitional National Assembly took the crucial step of
repealing the 2003 CPA-IGC statute and passing a slightly revised stat-
ute.236 This 2005 law gave the tribunal a new name (the Iraqi High Tribu-
nal), gave the tribunal additional authority, and extended offense
definitions; but essentially the law reiterated that the Iraqi High Tribunal
reflected "the will of the elected Iraqi government. 23 7
B. Measuring Legitimacy
The traditional law of occupation, as articulated in the 1907 Hague
Regulations 238 and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 23 9 provides insight into
229. See id.
230. Coalition Provisional Authority Reg. No. 6, § 2(1).
231. Compare Coalition Provisional Authority Reg. No. 1, § 1(2), with Coalition Provi-
sional Authority Reg. No. 6.
232. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 48, § 1(1) CPA/ORD/9 Dec 2003/48
(Dec. 10, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031210-
CPAORD_48_IST andAppendixA.pdf.
233. The Iraqi High Tribunal was originally named the Iraqi Special Tribunal. See
Guenael Mettraux, Comment, The 2005 Revision of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribu-
nal, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 287, 287 (2007). When the IGC was later dissolved and
replaced by an elected Iraqi National Assembly, the Assembly replaced the statute of the
IST with a partially revised statute and renamed the Tribunal the Iraqi High Tribunal.
See id.
234. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 48, § 1(1).
235. See Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and
National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347, 403-04 (2006).
236. Id. at 404.
237. Id.
238. See Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43,
annexed to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
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the question of whether the IHT, in light of the processes by which it came
into being, is indeed a legitimate tribunal.240 The Coalition's occupation
of Iraq had wide-ranging transformative purposes,2 4 1 including, but not
limited to, the creation of a tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and top
Ba'athist officials.24 2 Conversely, the law of occupation embraces a con-
servationist principle that limits the changes occupying powers can make
to occupied territories. 24 3 This limitation on the power of occupiers stood
in potential conflict with the Coalition's transformative goals for Iraq,
including the creation of a tribunal to try members of the old regime.
2 44
Nonetheless, a careful interpretation of the law of occupation suggests that
the creation of the IHT fits within its boundaries.
For example, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations constrains the power
of an occupier to ignore the laws of an occupied territory.24 5 It provides:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of
the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore,
and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. 24 6
Article 43 contains the "unless absolutely prevented" escape clause
that allows for flexibility in practice and has left room for changes in the
law of occupied countries in the past.2 47 For example, the nature of fascist
laws in Germany and Italy "absolutely prevented" the Allies from keeping
those laws in place during the Allied post-World War II occupation.
24 8
Furthermore, the establishment of a tribunal to try Ba'athist officials for
atrocities inflicted on the Iraqi people can be seen as a "measure[ ] ... to
restore . . .public order and safety."2 49 Professor Jeremy Rabkin argues
that, in this vein, local justice for past horrors can work to bring about
stable democracy devoid of lingering resentments. 250 Likewise, Professor
Michael A. Newton contends that because the essence of occupation law is
the obligation to restore peace, safety, and public order, the IHT is war-
ranted "under the inherent occupation authority of the Coalition" to restore
239. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 64, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
240. See Newton, supra note 212, at 870-71.
241. See Roberts, supra note 223, at 605-18 (discussing the "ambitious transforma-
tive policy of the CPA" and its tension with traditional law of occupation).
242. See Hollywood, supra note 222, at 113-14.
243. See Roberts, supra note 223, at 580 ("[O]ccupying powers should respect the
existing laws and economic arrangements within the occupied territory, and should
therefore, by implication, make as few changes as possible.").
244. See id. (discussing "potential conflicts between the conservationist principle on
the one hand, and transformative goals on the other").
245. See Newton, supra note 212, at 870.
246. Hague Regulations, supra note 238, art. 43.
247. See Roberts, supra note 223, at 587.
248. See id.; see also Newton, s'pma note 212, at 870.
249. Hague Regulations, supra note 238, art. 43.
250. See Rabkin, supra note 122, at 765-66.
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public calm and stability in Iraq.25 1 Though Article 43 embodies a princi-
ple of conservation, its escape clause provides a source of legitimacy for
the IHT.
2 5 2
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 slightly revised the law of
occupation, allowing for occupiers like the Coalition to more easily justify
changes to the institutions of occupied territories. 25 3 The Fourth Geneva
Convention includes provisions particularly applicable to changes to an
occupied territory's court system.2 54 Article 64 reads:
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the
exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power
in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the
application of the present Convention. Subject to the latter consideration
and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the
tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all
offences covered by the said laws.
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied
territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to
fulfil [sic] its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the
orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occu-
pying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or admin-
istration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication
used by them.2
55
Expanding on Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, the second para-
graph of Article 64 functions as an escape clause, explicitly allowing
changes to the occupied country's penal laws in cases of military and polit-
ical necessity, and to fulfill the object and purposes of the Convention. 25 6
The preamble of CPA Order No. 48 includes such a justification, expres-
sing a determination "to prevent any threat to public order ... and to pro-
mote the rule of law."'25 7 CPA Order No. 48, therefore, is a valid
modification of Iraqi law by the Coalition pursuant to its authority under
occupation law. Professor Carlos Yordan has interpreted the Fourth
Geneva Convention as requiring the occupying power "to rule the territory
with existing governmental institutions. ' 258 Yet, Yord~n's analysis does not
recognize the flexibility permitted by the language of the Convention. Arti-
251. See Newton, supra note 212, at 868.
252. Id. at 872-73.
253. See Roberts, supra note 223, at 587-88 (opining that the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion was a "modest modification" of the Hague Regulations allowing for "more scope for
changes in the existing local laws").
254. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 239, art. 64.
255. Id. (emphasis added).
256. See Newton, supra note 212, at 871, 874-75. (characterizing the underlying pur-
pose of the Fourth Geneva Convention as seeking "to alleviate the suffering of the civil-
ian population and ameliorate the potentially adverse consequences of occupation
subsequent to military defeat").
257. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 48, pmbl., CPA/ORD/9 Dec 2003/48
(Dec. 10, 2003).
258. Carlos L. Yordan, Why Did the U.N. Security Council Support the Anglo-American
Project to Transform Postwar Iraq? The Evolution of International Law in the Shadow of the
American Hegemon, 3 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 61, 85 (2007).
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cle 64 requires that existing courts continue to function, but does not
explicitly prohibit the formation of additional tribunals for reasons encom-
passed by its second paragraph. 25 9 CPA Order No. 48 may have pushed
the limits of traditional occupation law as articulated in the Fourth Geneva
Convention, but it does not plainly violate the Convention.
Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention further provides for
changes to domestic legal structures. 260 The provision reads:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any
case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention
by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into
the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement
concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occu-
pying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the
occupied territory.26 1
Article 47 implicitly sanctions changes introduced into the institutions
of an occupied territory, so long as they do not deprive protected persons
of the benefits of the Convention.2 62 It is hard to see how the formation of
an accountability mechanism would deprive Iraqis of the benefits of the
Geneva Convention. In all, the law of occupation does not by itself delegi-
timize the Coalition's efforts to try Saddam Hussein in Iraq.26 3 The excep-
tions regarding the prohibition on structural changes to an occupied
territory's institutions have, in a sense, swallowed the rule so that substan-
tial elimination, alteration, and formation of institutions have been widely
practiced.2 64
Along with the law of occupation, the International Military Tribunal
in Nuremberg, established by the Allies as occupiers of Germany, serves as
precedent that suggests that the IHT is a legitimate institution. Much like
the Coalition controlled post-invasion Iraq via the CPA, the Allies governed
post-war Germany through a Control Council.26 5 Control Council Law
No. 10 provided the legal basis for the Nuremberg Trials. 266 Article III
authorized "[e]ach occupying authority, within its Zone of Occupation" to
arrest and try those accused of crimes laid out in the Nuremberg Char-
ter.26 7 The IMT, like the IHT, was the product of non-democratic promul-
259. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 239, art. 64.
260. See id. art. 47.
261. Id.
262. See Newton, supra note 212, at 874-75 (interpreting Article 47 to allow for
"sweeping changes").
263. See Roberts, supra note 223, at 587 (noting that "the basic requirement to respect
the existing legal framework of a territory has long been under pressure," particularly
where the occupied territory had previously "been under dictatorial or extremist rule").
264. See id. at 588-89.
265. See EARL F. ZIEMKE, THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY, 1944-1946
342 (1990).
266. Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes Against the Peace, and Against Humanity, pmbl., Dec. 20 1945.
reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR
WORLD PEACE 491, 491-92 (1975).
267. See id. art. 1II(i)(a), reprinted in FERENCZ, supra note 266, at 493.
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gations imposed upon an occupied territory-demonstrating the legal
realities of occupation. 26 8 Nonetheless, occupation law did not prevent the
United Nations from adopting the Nuremberg Principles in the aftermath
of the trials.
The United Nations continues to have a role in legitimizing judicial
efforts in occupied territories. In the case of Iraq, the Coalition sought to
legitimize its efforts in the eyes of the international community to persuade
UN Member States and NGOs to assist in its transformative agenda. 2 69
This goal led the Coalition to seek after-the-fact ratification of its occupa-
tion, as well as authorization of and support for its policies at the UN
Security Council.2 70 The Coalition largely succeeded, as the Security
Council passed Resolution 1483, "recognizing the specific authorities,
responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of [the
United States and the United Kingdom] as occupying powers. '2 7 1 The
Security Council, inter alia, "affirm[ed] the need for accountability for
crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime"2 72 and
"encourag[ed] international efforts to promote legal and judicial
reform. '2 73 Resolution 1483 largely accomplished the Coalition's tripar-
tite goal of achieving recognition as a legitimate occupier of Iraq, encourag-
ing contributions to the reconstruction of Iraq and providing an impetus
for trying Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
2 74
In August and October of 2003, the Security Council issued two
important follow-up resolutions on Iraq: Resolutions 1500 and 1511,
which ratified further CPA efforts. 2 75 Despite the fact that the IGC con-
sisted solely of Coalition appointees and excluded several political interests
opposed to Coalition policy, 276 the IGC gained Security Council recogni-
tion.277 Resolution 1500 "[w]elcome[d] the establishment of the broadly
representative Governing Council of Iraq on 13 July 2003 as an important
step towards the formation by the people of Iraq of an internationally rec-
ognized, representative government that will exercise the sovereignty of
Iraq."278 Resolution 1511 reiterated the themes of Resolution 1483: again
268. See Newton, supra note 212, at 870 (commenting that the escape clause of Arti-
cle 43 of the Hague Regulations allowed the Allies to make broad changes in defeated
Axis countries and did not force the Allies to respect fascist institutions and laws).
269. See Yordan, supra note 258, at 93 ("For the Bush administration, a new resolu-
tion was necessary to legitimize its plans to transform Iraq and to call on other states to
contribute peacekeepers and to help finance post-war efforts.").
270. For an analysis of the negotiations leading up to Security Council pronounce-
ments regarding post-invasion Iraq, see id. at 88-92.
271. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 3, pmbl. (emphasis added).
272. Id.
273. Id. [ 8(i).
274. See id. pmbl., c[ 8(i). But see Yorddn, supra note 258, at 93 (asserting that the
"UN did not fully capitulate to American interests").
275. See S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003); S.C. Res. 1500, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1500 (Aug. 14, 2003).
276. See supra notes 227-231 and accompanying text for a discussion of CPA Regula-
tion No. 6.
277. S.C. Res. 1500, supra note 275, 1.
278. Id.
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recognizing the Coalition as the legitimate, though temporary, occupier of
Iraq; urging a transfer of sovereignty to a representative Iraqi government
as quickly as possible; and encouraging contributions to humanitarian,
reconstruction, and police training efforts. 27 9
The Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, in which the IHT convicted Sad-
dam Hussein, offers crucial language defending its legitimacy:
And as been [sic] clarified to us, 280 the Temporary Coalition Government is
considered a transitional authority in Iraq until achieving full sovereignty
according to article (43) of The Hague Laws of 1907- the orientation of the
occupier is to respect the language, norms and traditions of the occupied
country. And whereas the Coalition Government had the legal authority to
amend the Iraqi Local Law according to the conditions determined in para-
graph (64) of Geneva Convention for protecting the people, and according to
the decision of the Security Council number (1483).281
The IHT reached the conclusion that the Geneva Convention permit-
ted the Coalition's authorization and backing of the Tribunal. 28 2 It sup-
ported its conclusion with favorable pronouncements by the Security
Council, 28 3 of which the United States and the United Kingdom are veto-
holding Permanent Members. 284
To what extent do Security Council Resolutions confer legitimacy
upon the CPA and, consequently, upon the IHT as an institution estab-
lished by the CPA? Professor Achilles Skordas argues that the legitimacy of
what he dubs a "hegemonic intervention" depends on "the institutional
support of, and acceptance by, the international community. '28 5 Skordas
contends that the conceptual framework of the UN Charter calls for assess-
ing the legitimacy of a given use of force as either an illegitimate threat to
international peace and security or a legitimate means of restoring
peace. 286 In his view, Security Council Resolutions on post-invasion Iraq
reflect "the UN's indirect, albeit unwilling, endorsement of the US interven-
tionist policies."28 7 The effect of these Resolutions, according to Skordas,
is to render the Coalition occupation a legitimate means of restoring peace,
279. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 275, TI 1, 6, 8.
280. The submissive tone of this introductory phrase is worth noting. Does it suggest
that the American assistance provided to the IHT ordered the Iraqi judges on this partic-
ular point?
281. Al-Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 182, at 3.
282. See id. at 40-42.
283. See id. at 41-42; Achilles Skordas, Hegemonic Intervention as Legitimate Use of
Force, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 407, 442 (2007).
284. The five Permanent Members of the Security Council are the five major victors of
World War II: Russia, France, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See
U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1. Each holds a veto with which it can defeat any Security
Council Resolution. See id. art. 27, para. 3.
285. See Skordas, supra note 283, at 416.
286. See id. at 421-24, 442; see also U.N. Charter art. 39 ("The Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to Lhe peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accor-
dance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
287. See Skordas, supra note 283, at 439.
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as opposed to a threat to peace. 288
Carlos Yordan reaches a similar conclusion. He suggests that, through
Resolution 1483, the Security Council revised the law of occupation to
align the law with the international community's growing preference for
the neo-liberal values espoused by the Coalition in its justification for post-
war transformation of Iraqi society. 289 According to Yord~n, the Security
Council did not merely succumb to U.S. pressure, rather the Security
Council articulated the international community's belief that sustainable
peace and security is best achieved by transforming faltering societies into
those that emphasize representative government and economic liberaliza-
tion.290 Equally important to YordAn's assessment is the Security Coun-
cil's demand that the CPA work with an administration representative of
the Iraqi people and take Iraqi interests into consideration, a concern
which he argues helped to put Resolution 1483 in line with the Fourth
Geneva Convention. 29 1 Consider that the creation of an independent judi-
cial organ in post-invasion Iraq reflects neo-liberal values, 29 2 and that
majority Iraqi sentiment favored trial and harsh punishment for Saddam
Hussein and his cohorts in Iraq. 293 Through this lens, the CPA's plan to
try Saddam Hussein at the IHT was a legitimate effort.
Professor Farhad Malekian offers a much different analysis of the legit-
imacy of the IHT. He finds fault with several aspects of the Tribunal's
makeup. For example, he argues that the administration of justice by
judges and prosecutors who were victims of Hussein's regime threatened
the impartiality of the Tribunal. 29 4 Malekian argues that, due to the inter-
national nature of many of Hussein's crimes, a stronger international ele-
ment was necessary at Hussein's trial to represent the international
community as a stakeholder. 295 He directs an equally harsh criticism at
the selective prosecution of Saddam Hussein by a tribunal monopolized by
U.S. political interests.29 6 An overarching theme of Malekian's argument is
that international criminal law "must, in all parts of the world, be
employed in all appropriate cases without regard to the juridical or political
strength of the heads of the relevant states."' 29 7 At the heart of this princi-
ple is an appeal for world leaders to abandon age-old power politics and
288. See id. at 442.
289. See Yorddn, supra note 258, at 92.
290. See id. at 92-93.
291. See id. at 93.
292. Id.
293. See Newton, supra note 212, at 895 ("The Iraqi people almost universally sup-
port the concept of prosecuting Saddam and other Ba'athist officials inside Iraq rather
than simply allowing an external tribunal to exercise punitive power.").
294. See Malekian, supra note 85, at 697.
295. See id. at 697-98. Malekian also challenges the competence of the Iraqi judges,
alleging that their knowledge of international law came from a crash course taught in
London by the occupying powers. See id. at 697 n.111.
296. See id. at 692 & n.96 ("[I]nternational criminal law should apply to those gov-
ernments, such as the United States, which participated in Hussein's international crim-
inal actions.").
297. Id. at 675.
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uses of force when enforcing international criminal law. 298
Many scholars saw the IHT as an isolated institution in a war zone,
barely propped up by the Coalition's military presence.29 9 Yet, the applica-
tion of force by states and an asymmetric power balance reflecting that
force seem to be here to stay. The United Nations played a minimal role in
the transitions taking place in Iraq.30 0 Though the Security Council
encouraged an international effort to supply troops and other assis-
tance, 30 1 Member States backed away. 30 2 The United States and the
United Kingdom were largely alone; the UN Envoy retreated from Iraq as
the insurgency raged.30 3 Assassinations, death threats, boycotts, and turn-
over on the bench all stood to potentially derail the IHT. 30 4 Still, the Coali-
tion remained determined to secure a functioning tribunal in Baghdad
during an ongoing insurgency, which was itself a show of military force
and control.30 5
Considering the events surrounding the invasion and occupation of
Iraq, the legitimacy of the IHT appears better measured on a continuum
than as a binary choice between legitimate and illegitimate. Greater coop-
eration at the international level and prior Security Council authorization
would have increased legitimacy. The lack of prior Security Council
authorization for the Iraq War reflects a failure of unanimous support for
the endeavor among the Permanent Members of the Security Council, as
well as a lack of general support among the ten other voting Members.30 6
Although this lack of support detracts from the legitimacy of developments
298. See id. at 721.
299. See Sylvia de Bertodano, Were There More Acceptable Alternatives to the Iraqi High
Tribunal?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JusT. 294, 296 (2007) (discussing "ample evidence of the
extreme conditions under which this court has had to work" due to "operat[ing] on the
ground in Baghdad"); see also Curtis FJ. Doebbler, Comment, An Intentionally Unfair
Trial, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 264, 269 (2007) (commenting on the assassinations of,
assaults on, and threats to defense lawyers).
300. See Christopher Marquis, Bush Faces New Obstacles in Keeping Allies' Support,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2004, at A8 (discussing how the UN pulled out of Iraq after a car
bomb killed seventeen people in August 2003).
301. See S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 275, 13-14 (authorizing "a multinational force
under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance
of security and stability in Iraq" and urging "Member States to contribute assistance
under this United Nations mandate, including military forces, to the multinational force
referred to in paragraph 13 above").
302. See Richard W. Stevenson, Bush in Europe to Rally Support for Iraq Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2004, at A16 ("The White House has played down the possibility of any
substantial diplomatic progress on dealing with Iraq, saying it does not expect NATO or
any individual European nations to send many additional troops to Iraq.").
303. See Marquis, supra note 300; Kirk Semple, Panel Faults U.N. on Lax Security for
Iraq Office, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at Al; Some U.S. Allies Rethink Iraq Commitments
as Violence Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004, at A9.
304. See de.Bertodano, supra note 299, at 296.
305. See Richard Boudreaux, Hussein Takes Stand, Urges Iraqis to Fight U.S.-Trial
Descends into Chaos;Judge Postpones Proceedings, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 16, 2006, at
15A.
306. See U.N. Charter arts. 23, 27 paras. 1, 3 (noting that each member of the Secur-
ity Counsel has one vote and that any non-procedural decisions are "made by an affirm-
ative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members").
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in Iraq, including those involving the IHT, it does not completely delegi-
timize the effort. International consensus is not the only consideration in
assessing legitimacy.
Despite the lack of steadfast political will at the international level, the
United States led an elaborate military-political effort in Iraq, relying on its
global position of power and self-authorization. 30 7 Once the United States
had already used force and had seemingly taken control of Iraq, the Secur-
ity Council faced a decision that strikes at the heart of its responsibilities
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 308 Article 39 advises: "The Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security. '30 9
The Security Council's recognition of the Coalition (the Authority)3 10
as "occupying powers"'3 11 reflects its legal-political position: the Security
Council forced to react to significant institutional upheaval that had
already occurred. As Resolution 1483 suggests, the Security Council, in
light of its Chapter VII responsibilities, believed that recognizing the01
authority of the United States and the United Kingdom in Iraq would help
maintain and restore peace and security under the circumstances. 3 12 The
alternative appeared to be to embolden and perpetuate the insurgency,
which the Security Council viewed as a threat to peace. 313 As Professor
Yord~n has observed, on an ideological level the majority of UN Member
States favored the neo-liberal values espoused by the Coalition over Islamic
fundamentalism and other ideas competing for prominence in Iraq.3 14
Resolution 1483 and the subsequent international position on Iraq were
fundamentally an adjustment to a new power reality.3 15
307. See John Dermody, Note, Beyond Good Intentions: Can Hybrid Tribunals Work
After Unilateral Intervention?, 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 77, 84 (2006).
308. See U.N. Charter art. 39.
309. Id.
310. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 3.
311. Id.
312. See id.
313. See Letter from Colin L. Powell, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Laura L. Baja, Jr., Presi-
dent, U.N. Sec. Council (June 5, 2004), annexed to S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1546 (June 8, 2004) ("As recent events have demonstrated, continuing attacks by insur-
gents, including former regime elements, foreign fighters, and illegal militias challenge
all those who are working for a better Iraq."); see also S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 275,
pmbl. ("[r] eaffirming its previous resolutions ... on threats to peace and security caused
by terrorist acts").
314. See Yordan, supra note 258, at 92-93; see also S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 313,
pmbl. ("Welcoming the commitment of the Interim Government of Iraq to work towards a
federal, democratic, pluralist, and unified Iraq, in which there is full respect for political
and human rights . . . [and] [a]ffirming the importance of the rule of law, national
reconciliation, respect for human rights including the rights of women, fundamental
freedoms, and democracy including free and fair elections.").
315. See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAQ: U.S. POST-SADDAM GOVERN-
ANCE AND SECURITY 14-17 (2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/1556500/
US-Air-Force-r131339.
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For the United States and its Coalition allies, with power came respon-
sibility. As occupier of Iraq, the United States, acting through the CPA, had
the obligation to act in the best interests of the Iraqi people. 31 6 Thus, the
degree to which the IHT comported with Iraqi notions of justice must fac-
tor into a legitimacy analysis. In this vein, Professor Frederic MWgret has
characterized the relationship of crimes and societies in terms of "owner-
ship. ' '3 17 Mgret's theory takes into account what he calls "a feeling of
entitlement that permeates debates about who should judge whom."3 18
Applying this framework to the trial of Saddam Hussein, Mgret argues that
Hussein's crimes can be said to "belong" to the Iraqi people, who suffered
at the hands of their former dictator.3 19 Professor Jeremy Rabkin likewise
rejects internationalism as a source of a tribunal's legitimacy, arguing that
"[t]he most compelling justice comes from a court system which can claim
to speak in the name of the society where the victims suffered."3 20 In light
of these sources, the IHT gained legitimacy through the support of the
elected Iraqi Transitional National Assembly 32 1 and through its distinctly
Iraqi makeup. 32 2 However, the extent of any departure by the United
States from its legitimate supporting role to achieve its goals at the expense
of Iraqi interests would detract from the IHT's legitimacy. 3 23
In sum, a measure of the IHT's legitimacy should take into account: 1)
the level of international support for the invasion of Iraq and subsequent
transformative developments there, best indicated by prior Security Coun-
cil authorization; 2) the degree to which the IHT comports with Iraqi pref-
erences for delivering justice upon Saddam Hussein; and 3) the level of
integrity, transparency, and sensitivity to Iraqi rights shown by the United
States in its military-political effort in Iraq. The IHT cannot be assessed in
a vacuum. It must be considered as one among many CPA-created and
316. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 239, arts. 4, 27; Hague Regulations,
supra note 238, arts. 43, 46; see also S.C. Res 1483, supra note 3, pmbl. ("recognizing the
specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of
these states as occupying powers") (emphasis added).
317. See Frederic Megret, In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of
International Criminal Justice, 38 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 725, 739-41 (2005).
318. Id. at 739.
319. Id. at 750. However, Megret also notes that Saddam Hussein openly defied inter-
national law, which suggests that the trial should have been partially internationalized.
See id.
320. Rabkin, supra note 122, at 775.
321. See Higonnet, supra note 235, at 404 (arguing that the democratically-elected
Transitional National Assembly's statute leant legitimacy to the IHT).
322. See id. at 401-02 (noting that the IHT "closely resembles a domestic court"); see
also Newton, supra note 212, at 896 (opining that the IHT "represents a return to the
first principles of international criminal law because it is grounded in the fertile soil of
state sovereignty"); Rabkin, supra note 122, at 776 ("Why wouldn't an Iraqi government
be the most proper authority to impose justice on Saddam and his fellow criminals?
Why wouldn't Iraqi justice be most reassuring to ordinary Iraqis?").
323. See Higonnet, supra note 235, at 404. (commenting on "extensive U.S. participa-
tion"); see also Dermody, supra note 307, at 80-81 (arguing that disciplined involvement
by the occupier in a tribunal's proceedings "demonstrate[s] to the international commu-
nity that the intervening actor is dedicated to the rule of law, which may dispel lingering
concerns about the motivation of an intervention").
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U.S.-funded institutions. CPA Order No. 48 authorizing the IHT must be
considered as one of many CPA laws.
3 24
The IHT fails in the first element of the above test, seeing as the IHT
was almost completely an institution of tripartite origin: the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Iraq.3 25 There was little international support
for the invasion and sparse international involvement in the IHT proceed-
ings. 326 Nevertheless, the IHT does draw legitimacy from the second ele-
ment. For example, the death penalty, particularly by hanging, is part of
Iraqi legal culture.3 2 7 Moreover, the judges' panel was entirely Iraqi.3 28 In
addition, the IHT Trial Chamber Opinion makes frequent reference to the
Iraqi Penal Code and the incorporation of international law into Iraqi
law. 3 29 As to the third consideration, the analysis of the level of integrity,
transparency, and sensitivity to Iraqi rights requires multiple volumes of
careful assessment beyond the scope of this Note.
Conclusion
Saddam Hussein's downfall affirms the preeminence of states in the
world political order. In the case of Iraq, the United States proved once
again that a Security Council mandate is not a precondition to the use of
force in the current international climate. 3 30 Once the U.S.-led Coalition
occupied Baghdad, the Security Council was forced to weigh its options in
the face of upheaval. The Security Council determined that in light of its
Chapter VII obligations, supporting the U.S. agenda in Iraq held the most
promise for restoring peace and security to Iraq, the region, and ultimately
the world.3 3 1 The Security Council was probably right in this assessment,
considering that the alternative-defying the United States-might be tan-
tamount to encouraging Islamic fundamentalists to take control of Iraq.
Self-authorized political moves by independent states forced the Security
Council to, in effect, exercise damage control.
The IHT, in this framework, was one of the many Coalition initiatives
that the circumstances compelled the Security Council to support.
3 32
324. See generally Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 48, CPA/ORD/9 Dec
2003/48 (Dec. 10, 2003).
325. See Higonnet, supra note 235, at 400-01 (quoting M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Con-
flict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 327,
344-45 (2005)).
326. See id. at 401; see also Some U.S. Allies Rethink Iraq Commitments as Violence
Grows, supra note 303, at A9.
327. See Penal Law No. 111 [1969], 11 86 (Iraq), available at http://law.case.edu/
grotian-moment-blog/documents/Iraqi Penal Code 1969.pdf ("The death penalty is the
hanging of the condemned person by the neck until he is dead.").
328. Scharf, supra note 179, at 259.
329. See Al-Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 182, at 35 (discussing how an
international convention on civil and political rights became part of Iraqi law when Iraq
ratified in 1971); id. at 43 (concluding that the Fourth Geneva Convention became part
of Iraqi law when Iraq ratified in 1956).
330. See discussion supra Part 1ll.
331. See supra notes 310-315 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 310-315 and accompanying text.
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How far Security Council backing goes in legitimizing the IHT, then, is a
question of degree. If one's concept of legitimacy is completely divorced
from power politics, absence of selective prosecution, strict application of
international standards of due process, and life imprisonment as the maxi-
mum penalty, even Security Council Resolution 1483 cannot provide legiti-
macy to the IHT. However, if one views obtaining the backing of the
Security Council as a threshold that provides legitimacy regardless of the
Security Council's reason for supporting the effort, then the IHT is indeed
a legitimate institution.
Either way, the U.S.-backed Iraqi High Tribunal sets the precedent that
states can bypass the Security Council and rely on military force to prose-
cute ousted government officials. Threats of Permanent Member vetoes
will continue to prevent the Security Council from creating ad hoc tribu-
nals in all but the clearest of circumstances. The IHT suggests that the
future of international criminal law will be heavily tied to state-based
politics.

